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The migration of Ukrainians in times of crisis
Marta Jaroszewicz
Before the Russian annexation of Crimea and the outbreak of the conflict in eastern Ukraine, 
the scale of labour outward migration of Ukrainians had been characterised by a slight down-
ward trend. Back in 2014, an increase in the number of Ukrainians who migrated to Russia 
was observed, although no similar increase was recorded for EU countries (excluding Poland). 
The year 2015 brought a more rapid surge in the number of Ukrainians migrating to the EU, 
again mainly to Poland. Due to the lack of current EU-wide data, estimates can be made based 
only on data compiled by national statistical offices in countries which are the most popular 
with Ukrainian migrants. In Poland, as of October 2015 Ukrainians held 52,000 valid resi-
dence cards. Much greater migration dynamics have been observed in the case of temporary 
migration – the number of declarations which enable an individual to take up a temporary 
job in Poland, issued in the first half of 2015, was a staggering 400,000. This means a more 
than twofold increase – in the whole of 2014 372,000 declarations were issued to Ukrainian 
citizens. No similar increase has so far been observed in other EU states, including Italy and 
the Czech Republic, which have always been popular destinations for Ukrainian migration. 
In late 2014, 233,000 Ukrainian migrants were registered in Italy (in late 2013 the figure was 
191,000), whereas in the Czech Republic the number of Ukrainian migrants remains stable – 
104,000 in June 2015. 
The ongoing military conflict in eastern 
Ukraine, as a result of which approximately 
6,000 individuals were killed and approximately 
2,000,000 had to flee their homes, has contrib-
uted to a significant increase in the number of 
applications for refugee status submitted in EU 
countries by Ukrainian citizens. In 2014, Ukrain-
ians submitted 14,000 applications for refugee 
status (1,120 in 2013). This increase should be 
viewed in an EU-wide context. For comparison, 
in 2014 individuals who fled Syria submitted 
138,000 applications for refugee status in the 
EU and citizens of Western Balkan states sub-
mitted 109,000 applications. Bearing in mind 
the current migration crisis in Europe, it should 
be expected that during this year citizens of Syr-
ia alone will submit over 500,000 applications 
for refugee status within the EU. 
Data compiled for 2014 and the first half of 
2015 suggests that in the case of Poland there 
was a change in the trend regarding migration 
dynamics and strategies applied by Ukraini-
an citizens. Temporary migration to Poland is 
becoming an increasingly popular method of 
coping with poverty and instability in Ukraine. 
It has also been evident that, unlike in previous 
years, Ukrainians ever more choose settlement 
migration to Poland. It is still unclear how pop-
ular new migration patterns are among resi-
dents of other parts of Ukraine, i.e. other than 
the western part. Similarly, it is unclear whether 
the current increase is merely a temporary re-
action of Ukrainian society to the unfavourable 
economic situation and to the military conflict. 
Of equal importance is the question whether 
Ukrainian citizens’ current increased interest 
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in migration is aimed only at Poland or whether it 
will affect other EU countries as well. It will take 
several years for this question to be answered. 
‘Pre-war’ migration 
The large scale of external migration was 
a feature typical of Ukrainian society for a long 
time following the collapse of the USSR. How-
ever, in 2008-2009 the dynamics of migration 
became weaker. According to all-Ukrainian 
research on labour emigration, in 2005–2008 
1.5 million Ukrainians worked abroad, and in 
2010–2012 the figure was 1.2 million1. The de-
crease was mainly due to the global econom-
ic crisis and reduced demand for Ukrainian 
workers in the EU and in Russia. Similarly, the 
migration strategies of Ukrainian citizens have 
changed. They began to prefer temporary and 
circular migration, which enabled them to earn 
a lower income, but in exchange made it eas-
ier to maintain close relations with the home-
land. This trend was also connected with the 
change in the list of most popular migration 
destinations. Back in 2005–2008, the most 
popular countries included Russia, Italy and the 
Czech Republic, whereas in 2010–2012 the top 
two destinations were Russia and Poland. Both 
countries applied relatively liberal migration 
policy towards Ukrainians, which fostered fre-
quent travels by migrants2. In total, Russia and 
the EU each accounted for approximately 50% 
of migration flows from Ukraine, with Russia’s 
share decreasing slowly. Moreover, as shown in 
a research project carried out in 2013-2014 by 
OSW in cooperation with research centres from 
seven countries of the region, ‘pre-war’ migra-
tion (from before the annexation of Crimea by 
1 For more see O. Betliy, The perspective of Ukraine, (in:) 
M. Jaroszewicz, M. Lesińska (ed.) Forecasting migration 
between the EU, V4 and Eastern Europe, OSW 2014, pp. 
160-162.
2 M. Jaroszewicz, Poland more attractive for Ukrainian 
economic migrants, OSW Analyses, 12 June 2013, 
ht tp: / / w w w.os w.waw.p l /e n /pub l i k ac j e /ana l y -
ses/2013-06-12/poland-more-attractive-ukrainian-eco-
nomic-immigrants
Russia and the outbreak of the military conflict 
in eastern Ukraine) was characterised by more ra-
tional migration choices inspired by experiences 
of migration gained over many years and by ex-
tensive migration networks in destination coun-
tries. The main features of this trend involved at-
tempts by migrants to legalise their stay in host 
countries as well as the increased popularity 
of migration for educational purposes3. 
Before 2014 approximately 70% of Ukrainian 
labour migrants came from the western part 
of the country, in which migration had become 
a widespread method of coping with poverty 
and low salaries. A 2012 all-Ukrainian research 
study on labour migration revealed that the 
ratio of involvement in migration among res-
idents of western Ukraine4 aged 17–70 was 
10.8%, whereas in the eastern part of the coun-
try5 the corresponding ratio was a mere 1%. 
More than two thirds of migrants heading for 
Poland came from Galicia6. 
In the period under discussion, migration by 
Ukrainians was purely economic in nature. 
This was in contrast to, for example, Geor-
gians or inhabitants of North Caucasus, who 
had to flee war or persecution. Until the out-
break of the conflict, Ukrainians had practically 
submitted no applications for refugee status 
in EU countries. 
3 Jaroszewicz, Lesińska, op. cit.
4 Researchers have identified the following regions as 
western Ukraine: Volyn, Zakarpats’ka, Ivano-Frankivsk, 
Lviv, Rivne, Ternopil, Khmelnyts, Chernivtsi. 
5 The following regions have been identified as eastern 
Ukraine: Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, Lu-
hansk and Kharkiv. 
6 International Labour Organization, Report on The Meth-
odology, Organization and Results of a Modular Sample 
Survey on Labour Migration in Ukraine, 2013, pp. 37–40
There was a change in the ranking of the 
most popular destination countries for 
Ukrainian migration to the EU – Poland 
replaced Italy and the Czech Republic.
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What has changed? The evolution 
of internal migration 
Russia’s annexation of Crimea, inhabited by 
2 million people, in March 2014, combined 
with the outbreak of the still ongoing military 
conflict in parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk re-
gions in spring 2014 (according to the UN esti-
mates, approximately 5 million individuals have 
been directly affected by the conflict), have 
mainly changed the nature and the dynamics 
of internal migration of Ukrainians. A rapid in-
crease in the level of mobility of residents of 
eastern Ukraine, who previously had lived a rel-
atively settled life, was observed. According to 
the data of Ministry of Social Policy of Ukraine, 
in mid-September 2015 the official number of 
internally displaced persons (IDPs) from Donetsk 
and Luhansk regions and from Crimea was 
1,438,000. Interestingly, in the initial phase of 
displacements most of these individuals head-
ed for western Ukraine (these included mainly 
Crimean Tatars); at present people are migrat-
ing within the Donetsk and Luhansk regions or 
to the nearest neighbouring regions (including 
the Kharkiv and Zaporizhzhia regions) and to 
Kyiv (for more see map). These regions host 
nearly 80% of all IDPs7. Since the beginning 
of the conflict, an increase in the number of 
internal refugees has been observed, and the 
growth dynamics depends mainly on the level 
of intensity of military action and on changes 
to the rules for registering displaced individu-
als. At present, the dynamics is at the level of 
medium-high – approximately 15,000–20,000 
individuals per week8.
7 Data compiled by the Ministry of Social Policy of Ukraine. 
8 Ibidem.
External migration: the consequences 
of the military conflict 
As far as external migration of Ukrainians 
is concerned, the trends are more diverse. 
At present, no EU-wide statistical data is avail-
able to explicitly confirm the assumption that 
the pre-war trend in migration of Ukrainians 
to the EU has changed as a result of the out-
break of the military conflict. It should be re-
membered, however, that in 2014 EU countries 
registered 14,000 applications for refugee sta-
tus submitted by Ukrainian citizens, including 
2,318 applications in Poland. These figures are 
not alarming. Moreover, it is unclear whether 
the upward trend will be continued in 2015. 
Between February and April 2015 there was 
a significant increase in the number of submit-
ted applications for refugee status, although in 
May and June 2015 a decrease was recorded. 
Generally speaking, between April 2014 and 
June 2015 the monthly trend for the whole EU 
oscillated around 1,000-2,000 individuals (for 
more see Appendix: Table 1). Polish data sug-
gesting that since June 2015 the number of appli-
cations submitted by Ukrainians has been in de-
cline, might be considered a kind of indication9. 
It should also be taken into consideration that 
the so-called recognition rate regarding asylum 
applications submitted by Ukrainians is relative-
ly low – 21% in 201410, which suggests that in 
the future Ukrainians may abandon this method 
of getting to the EU. According to the European 
Asylum Support Office (EASO), Ukrainians seek-
ing international protection can be divided into 
two groups with two different migration pro-
files. The first group are individuals fleeing those 
parts of eastern Ukraine which remain outside 
central government’s control, and the other 
group includes individuals dodging compulsory 
military service11.
9 Office for Foreigners, Report on citizens of Ukraine 
(as of 13 September 2015).
10 Data compliled by the European Asylum Support Office 
(EASO). 
11 https://easo.europa.eu/wp-content/uploads/EASO-An-
nual-Report-2014.pdf
The Annexation of Crimea and the war in 
eastern Ukraine have mainly contributed 
to an increase in the level of internal mo-
bility of Ukrainians.
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To clearly confirm whether after the outbreak 
of the military conflict the scale of migration 
of Ukrainians to the EU indeed increased, one 
would need to analyse not only data on asylum 
seekers but also information on the number of 
residence permits issued to citizens of Ukraine 
in specific EU countries according to the regions 
from which these individuals come (which 
would help determine whether they come from 
regions affected by the conflict). So far, no 
such data has been compiled. Only aggregate 
Eurostat data for 2014 is available which shows 
that in that year Ukrainians held 859,000 resi-
dence cards in the EU (in 2013 849,000). 
The assumption suggesting that there was 
a surge in external migration from Ukraine, 
caused by the war, is undoubtedly more legit-
imate in the case of Russia which directly bor-
ders the territory affected by the conflict and 
supports separatists’ rule there. However for 
political reasons, Russia’s leadership tend to 
overestimate the number of refugees; a de-
tailed analysis of available data suggests that 
approximately 500,000 individuals from east-
ern Ukraine arrived in Russia. The Federal Mi-
gration Service of Russia has announced that 
between the beginning of 2014 and 1 July 2015 
as many as 355,000 citizens of Ukraine submit-
ted their applications for so-called temporary 
refugee status in Russia. A further 209,000 in-
dividuals applied for temporary residence per-
mits, 114,000 individuals joined the programme 
of voluntary resettlement of ethnic Russians, 
and 43,000 individuals submitted applications 
for permanent residence permits. The exact 
number and type of applications submitted by 
residents of regions directly affected by the mil-
itary conflict is not known, however. 
Labour migration 
It would be more legitimate to assume that as 
a result of deterioration of the economic situa-
tion in Ukraine, triggered by the military con-
flict, and of devaluation of income earned by 
Ukrainians in real terms, there was an increase 
in the scale of labour migration of Ukrainians to 
the EU. One should bear in mind that Ukraine 
closed 2014 with the 7% GDP drop. In the first 
and the second quarter of 2015 a drop in GDP 
was recorded of 17% and 14%, respectively. In 
2014, the value of the hryvnia declined by 70%, 
and the inflation rate stood at 50%12. All this 
has contributed to a major decline in the lev-
el of real income earned by Ukrainian citizens. 
According to data compiled by the World Bank, 
in 2014 Ukraine’s annual GDP per capita was 
US$ 3,000 (calculated according to the current 
exchange rate), whereas in 2013 the figure was 
US$ 4,000. Additionally, as shown by data from 
the Statistical Committee of Ukraine, in the first 
four months of 2015 the real wage was reduced 
by over 20% as compared with the correspond-
ing period of 2014. The US dollar equivalent 
(calculated according to the current exchange 
rate) of an average salary in Ukraine in April 
2015 was a mere US$ 130, which ranked the 
country in last position in the list of former 
USSR countries13. 
According to Italian, German and Portuguese 
statistics, in 2014 a slight increase in the num-
ber of Ukrainians holding residence permits in 
these countries was recorded (sometimes, how-
ever, national data are in contrast to Eurostat 
data, which do not show any upward trend). 
12 For more see T. Iwański, A ship run aground. Deepen-
ing problems in the Ukrainian economy, OSW Com-
mentary, 16 June 2015, http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/
publikacje/osw-commentary/2015-06-16/a-ship-run-
aground-deepening-problems-ukrainian-economy
13 http://www.epravda.com.ua/news/2015/05/26/544039/
There is no evidence to confirm the in-
creased scale of migration of Ukrainians 
to the EU as a result of the outbreak of the 
military conflict. There has been a rapid in-
crease in short-term economic migration 
to Poland.
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The Ukrainian diaspora in Italy (approximately 
200,000 individuals) and in Germany (100,000 
individuals) is too small, in the context of the 
influx of migrants from other countries, to make 
Ukrainians a well-researched migrant group in 
quantitative and qualitative terms. In recent 
years, the Czech Republic, which in 2003–2008 
recorded a significant increase in the scale of 
economic migration from Ukraine, introduced 
restrictions in its admission policy. As a conse-
quence, the number of Ukrainians staying in this 
country has remained practically unchanged. 
The case of Poland 
So far, Poland has been the only EU country to 
record a significant increase in the scale of mi-
gration from Ukraine. This mainly results from 
the Polish economy long-term growth and 
simplified procedures of access to the job mar-
ket granted to citizens of Eastern Partnership 
states, as well as a relatively large demand for 
workers in agriculture and in private house-
holds. The so-called system of declarations 
has been a particular ‘pull factor’ for Ukraini-
ans. Pursuant to a regulation by the Minister 
of Labour and Social Policy of 2011, a citizen of 
Ukraine who wants to take up a temporary job 
in Poland is exempt from the obligation to ob-
tain a work permit. The only requirement they 
need to meet is to hold a declaration confirming 
the intention to employ the specific individual, 
registered by their prospective employer with 
the local employment office. The procedure is 
free of charge and requires minimal formali-
ties. Other ‘pull factors’ include linguistic and 
cultural similarity, as well as low travel costs. 
Direct bus connections linking Polish cities with 
Ukrainian towns, used mainly by migrants, have 
become particularly popular. As the number of 
Ukrainians living in Poland increases, migra-
tion networks are becoming extended, which 
makes migrants feel safer due to the fact that 
they have access to legal, medical and employ-
ment assistance in their native language. 
In the Polish context, it is very important to dif-
ferentiate between long-term migration and 
temporary migration. Long-term migration 
has recorded an upward trend, even though 
it is insignificant in absolute numbers, yet at 
the same time being relatively well described 
in figures. Temporary migration, on the other 
hand, has probably been increasing much more 
rapidly, although it is still difficult to research 
in statistical terms. As far as long-term migra-
tion is concerned, in the 2011 national census 
in Poland a mere 24,000 individuals claimed 
that they held Ukrainian citizenship. According 
to data compiled by the Office for Foreigners, 
at the end of 2013 Ukrainians held over 37,000 
valid residence cards. In October 2015, howev-
er, the number was 52,000, including 21,000 
permanent residence cards and 28,000 tem-
porary residence cards. No data is available as 
to how many residence cards have been issued 
to individuals coming from the Donetsk and 
Luhansk regions. 
A major problem involves estimates regarding 
the current number of Ukrainian migrants tem-
porarily working in Poland. In this case, citizens 
of Ukraine obtain declarations enabling them to 
take up a job by a simplified procedure for up 
to six months in a year (however, here statistics 
do not show the number of individuals but the 
number of permits and one individual may hold 
several permits). The other possibility is that 
they work illegally holding only tourist visas. 
According to estimates, currently there are ap-
proximately 300,000–500,000 such individuals 
in Poland. In 2014, 372,000 declarations regard-
ing the intention of employing a foreigner were 
issued to Ukrainians (an increase of 60% as com-
It is difficult to estimate the current num-
ber of individuals staying in Poland in 
a specific period under a simplified em-
ployment procedure.
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pared with 2013). In the first half of 2015 alone, 
as many as 402,000 such declarations sub-
mitted by citizens of Ukraine were registered, 
most of them for jobs in agriculture. As many 
as 139,000 declarations were issued to women, 
which is typical of Ukrainian migration to Po-
land. Also, in this case it is not known whether 
these declarations are still being issued mainly 
to residents of Galicia or equally to residents of 
other parts of Ukraine, in particular the eastern 
regions (for more see Appendix: Table 2). 
Poland is thus becoming a host country for im-
migrants and is reinforcing its status as the EU’s 
most popular destination country for Ukrainian 
temporary migrants. It is likely that the upward 
trend will continue for several more years as 
there are no prospects for a quick improvement 
of the economic situation in Ukraine. Several 
questions still remain unanswered, however. 
It is not known whether Ukrainian migrants will 
develop migration networks in other EU coun-
tries and move to those states which may offer 
them higher salaries. Due to the still prevalent 
temporary nature of immigration to Poland, 
it is too early to explicitly state that Poland is 
becoming the EU’s main destination for settle-
ment migration of Ukrainian citizens.
Forecasts and the political context 
When assessing further prospects for migration 
of Ukrainians to the EU, two aspects should 
be taken in consideration. The first aspect in-
volves possible factors which could either foster 
greater geographical expansion of migration 
to countries other than Poland or, converse-
ly, could restore its ‘pre-war’ scale. The other 
aspect involves the political and social con-
text in which the migration of Ukrainians or, 
more broadly, any migration, is currently be-
ing viewed in Europe which is undergoing the 
largest wave of refugee migration since the end 
of World War II.
As far as possible variables which could impact 
the dynamics and the nature of migration are 
concerned, undoubtedly the most important 
factor is the economic situation in Ukraine. 
Although the first symptoms of stabilisation 
of the economic and social situation can be 
seen, including, for example, the successful 
re-negotiation of part of the country’s external 
debt or the indexation of salaries and raising 
of the minimum wage, the current trends sug-
gest that complete recovery from the crisis will 
take a considerable time. The unemployment 
rate in Ukraine has been relatively low (ap-
proximately 9% if calculated according to ILO 
methodology). This results from the fact that 
state-owned companies maintain excessive 
numbers of employees whom in turn they can 
offer low salaries to. Considering the dramatic 
decline in Ukraine’s industrial production, this 
rate of unemployment is unlikely to be main-
tained at its current level over a long-term per-
spective. Other factors include the security situ-
ation in the region affected by the conflict and 
Russia’s policy towards Ukraine. It is still likely 
that fighting could resume in October 2015 in 
connection with local elections in Ukraine. Oth-
er issues which should also be borne in mind 
include economic deterioration in Russia and 
announcements by Russia’s leadership that so-
cial benefits granted to Ukrainian refugees will 
cease to be paid out in 2015. 
The presence of such a large group of internal-
ly displaced persons is frequently mentioned 
as the major factor to boost the likelihood of 
mass refugee movement from Ukraine. This 
fact should not be overestimated, however. 
Although internal displacement often inspires 
the person affected to migrate further, this is 
not always the case (as confirmed by the ex-
ample of IDPs in Azerbaijan or individuals dis-
The Continued migration of Ukrainians will 
mainly depend on the development of the 
economic situation in Ukraine.
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placed from South Ossetia as a result of the 
Russian-Georgian war of 2008). It should also 
be remembered that 60% of Ukrainian IDPs are 
elderly retired people14, who are not particu-
larly willing to take risky migration decisions. 
Moreover, the fact that displacements are most 
often carried out to nearby towns seems to 
confirm that the major motivation of some of 
IDPs is to continue to receive financial benefits 
from Ukraine’s budget, rather than the necessi-
ty of fleeing their previous place of residence. 
If IDPs begin to emigrate to the EU, a snowball 
effect can be expected. Residents of eastern 
Ukraine will gain migration experience (so far 
practically absent), migration networks in desti-
nation countries will be created, and migration 
itself as a way of life will become widely accept-
ed by this society. 
Regardless of the characteristics of Ukraini-
an migration, one should not lose sight of the 
fact that, in the context of the current migra-
tion crisis in the EU, migrants are increasing-
14 Data compiled by the Ministry of Social Policy of Ukraine.
ly being treated by EU societies as a burden. 
Similarly, anti-immigration political movements 
have been gaining ground. Moreover, states 
such as Italy and Germany, which are popular 
with Ukrainians as migration destinations, have 
been coping with the challenge of integrating 
hundreds of thousands of refugees from the 
Middle East and are unlikely to be interested 
in a greater opening of their job markets to 
citizens of Ukraine. It is not known, however, 
in which direction the migration policy of the 
Visegrad Group countries will evolve. These 
countries fear migration from the south but at 
the same time they openly state that they pre-
fer migrants from Ukraine due to their cultural 
affinity. So far, however, no change in this pol-
icy has been observed. The V4 countries apart 
from Poland have pursued a rather restrictive 
migration policy towards citizens of Ukraine. 
However Hungary who is restricted in its la-
bour migration policy at the same time enables 
ethnic Hungarians from Ukraine to be granted 
Hungarian citizenship in a simplified procedure. 
APPENDIX
Table 1. The number of applications for refugee status submitted in the EU 28 and in specific 
destination countries by citizens of Ukraine (January 2014–June 2015)
Apr 
2014
Jun 
2014
Oct 
2014
Dec 
2014
Mar 
2015
Apr 
2015
May 
2015
Jun 
2015
EU 28 680 1,020 2,235 1,495 1,850 1,965 1,560 1,685
Czech Rep. 45 35 65 45 90 80 45 -
Germany 65 110 575 435 395 460 505 635
Spain 25 40 185 105 35 25 70 -
France 50  115 260 145 160 185 125 130
Italy 70 135 400 230 445 540 360 350
Poland - 135 235 195 245 205 155 220
Sweden 70 110 175 140 165 135 115 160
Eurostat data
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Table 2. The number of declarations regarding the intention of employing a foreigner 
(a citizen of Ukraine) registered with employment offices in Poland in the first half of 2015
Total January February March April May June 
402,674 49,620 75,316 81,895 64,429 62,994 68,420
Map. Distribution of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Ukraine
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